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JUDICIAL METHOD AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE N. I. R. A.
BY RALPH F. FUCHS
I. THE LIABILITY TO ERR

"Unless we allow for the innate capacity of the human mind
to entertain contradictory beliefs at the same time, we shall in
vain attempt to understand the history of thought," says a
learned student of the subject.1 It is not irreverent to suggest
that even the wisest Supreme Court justices, in common with the
rest of mankind, including critics of the Court and commentators
upon its decisions, are possessed of this capacity. If the suggestion be true, it is futile to expect consistency in a body of decisions upon constitutional questions or any other questions. Excessive praise and excessive blame are alike inappropriate in discussions of the work of the Court. The basis for praise is likely
at any time to be withdrawn by some unaccountable yielding on
the part of the Court to an idea which negatives those that have
prevailed before; and there is little justification for blaming men
whose minds are subject to a well-nigh universal limitation.
Criticism, however, may serve to reveal error even where the
critic has made mistakes of his own. It is not improper or unfair to point out that less liability to err seems to prevail in some
quarters than in others or that too much power reposes in a single fallible tribunal. Recent decisions which bear upon the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act confirm
the view that the validity of major regulatory measures in the
eyes of the Supreme Court of the United States hinges upon
IFrazer, The Golden Bough, at 5, quoted in Adams, The Founding of

New England, at 68.
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hazardous factors to which the fate of the nation cannot wisely
2
be trusted.
As has been pointed out previously in these pages,3 three main
questions of constitutionality are raised by the Recovery Program of the present administration. These are: (1) the power
of Congress to legislate with reference to the conduct of businesses within the several states; (2) the power of Congress to
repose a wide discretion in the President in his exercise of delegated rule-making powers; and (3) the limitations of due process
in respect to the controls imposed upon private interests, with
reference to (a) the degree of interference involved and (b) the
procedure employed in administration. It is the National Industrial Recovery Act which at the present writing is the focus for
the discussion of these questions. It will be convenient to appraise the work of the Court with an eye to the security of the
"keystone of the Recovery arch," as the Act has been characterized.
There has been no visible government strategy in the presentation of cases to the Court. They have been allowed to arise as
they would, and the Court has been compelled to deal with issues
of wide significance in cases that have not revealed their more
important implications. Despite the possibility that distinctions
will be made in later cases which will save the most essential
governmental powers where their exercise is imperatively needed,
recent decisions have cast a pall of doubt, if not of unconstitutionality, upon the provisions of the Recovery Act.'
II. THE RATIONALE OF NEBBIA V. NEW YORK
Just one year after the Roosevelt administration took office
the Supreme Court in the case of Nebbi, v. New York' sustained
the establishment of a mandatory retail price for milk under the
2
The argument for this view is stated in Fuchs, The Constitutionality of
the Recovery Program (1933) 19 St. Louis L. Rev. 1.
3 Op, cit., at 12.
4 It is not intended to suggest that the validity of the National Industrial Recovery Act or even of the entire Recovery program is essential to
national salvation. It is believed, however, that the power of the Federal
Government to deal with economic problems in a comprehensive manner is
indispensable, without regard to the merits of any particular legislative
program. It can be asserted in behalf of the program of the present administration that it does attempt to deal fairly with many aspects of the
economic situation in a manner which certainly is not irrational. Fuchs, op.
cit., at 6-11.
5 (1934) 291 U. S. 502.
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authority of a state statute. In the meanwhile price regulation
under numerous N. R. A. codes had gone into effect or was con-

templated. Assuming the authority of the Federal Government
to regulate businesses within the states, there is only partial

justification in the opinion in the Nebbia case for the view that
price fixing or other drastic regulation, whether by Congress or

by state legislatures, will consistently be sustained. The constitutional issue involved, of course, is whether such regulation is

consistent with due process of law.
In regard to the constitutionality of legislative attempts at
price fixing, two competing doctrines have been at war in the
Court ever since the case of Munn v. llinois.6 According to the
one, there exists a class of businesses "affected with a public in-

terest" for which alone legislative regulation is justified. The
process of determining the constitutionality of a price-fixing

measure, accordingly, consists in the first instance of ascertaining whether the business which is being regulated does or does

not belong in this class. In the making of this determination the
weight which attaches to an act of the legislature is counterbal-

anced by the constitutional principle that "freedom is the general
rule and restraint the exception,"

7

and the businesses whose

prices may be established by law are relatively few in number. 8
According to the other doctrine, it is not possible to catalog in

legal terms the situations which justify legislative intervention
in private business, and not more so with reference to price fixing
than in regard to other forms of regulation. While it may be true
6 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
7 Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923)

262
U. S. 522, at 534.
s In an effort to clarify the meaning of the phrase, "clothed with a public
interest," Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the Wolff Packing Co. case, note 7
above, at 535, enumerated three classes of businesses which are so clothed.
These are: (1) businesses enjoying a "public grant of privileges"; (2) certain occupations, regarded as exceptional from the earliest times, such as
"those of the keepers of inns, cabs, and gristmills"; and (3) businesses
which "have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public" that governmental regulation is justified. It is the third class which is the critical one,
and the Chief Justice confused matters with respect to it by going on to say
that in a sense the public is concerned in every business and the real question is whether in a given instance the public interest is strong enough to
justify the particular form of regulation sought to be imposed. In regard
to price fixing, he noted that "In nearly all the businesses included under
the third head above, the thing which gave the public interest was the indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected without regulation."
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that "the common element" in past instances of judicially approved price fixing is "a situation or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the regulative force of competition,
so that buyers or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the
bargaining struggle that serious economic consequences result
to a very large number of members of the community," D the
ascertainment of the existence of this common element and the
appropriateness of price fixing as a remedy turn "upon considerations of economics about which there may be reasonable differences of opinion."1 0 It is the function of the legislature to make
these determinations. The judicial function ends with the ascertainment that the legislature has not acted in a purely arbitrary
manner in a given instance.",
The strict view, according to which price fixing legislation is
prima facie unconstitutional, had its full flowering in three cases
decided at the close of the "New Economic Era" which has since
yielded place to the "New Deal."' 2 The spirit of the contrary
view, although not its logical form, appears in Munn v. Illinois,13
Gernwj= Alliance Insurane Co. v. Kansas,'4 and the cases upholding Federal regulation of the stockyards, including the fixing
of service charges."5 The classic formulation of the view appears
in the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Stone in the Theater ticket
9 Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting, in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton (1927) 273
U. S. 418, at 451.
'oIbid., at 454.
21 Ibid.
12 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, note 9, above; Ribnik v. McBride (1928) 277
'L. S. 350; and Williams v. Standard Oil Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 235. These
cases held unconstitutional the attempts of state legislatures to fix, respectively, the commissions of theater ticket brokers, the commissions of private
employment exchanges, and the retail price of gasoline. A comprehensive
review and criticism of the doctrine of "public interest," from the historical
standpoint and from the standpoint of its application, is to be found in two
excellent recent articles: McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with
a Public Interest (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759, and Hamilton, Affectation
with a Public Interest (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 1089.
6, above. Budd v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 517, followed
1"Note
Munn v. Illinois. Brass v. North Dakota (1894) 153 U. S. 391, upheld
legislative fixing of rates for grain elevators not enjoying the monopoly
which featured their operation under the facts of the other two cases.
Other "Granger" cases, involving state regulation of railroads, were decided during the same period.
24 (1914) 233 U. S. 389. The Court, in a six-to-three decision, upheld
the power of a state to regulate fire insurance rates.
25 Stafford v. Wallace (1922) 258 U. S. 495, at 516; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States (1930) 280 U. S. 420.

JUDICIAL METHOD AND CONSTITUTIONALITY

case. 6 It perhaps underlay the decision in O'Gorman and
Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. and emerged triumphant, at
least for the time being, in the Nebbia case, 18 in which Mr. Justice Roberts adopts the logic of Mr. Justice Stone's earlier dissent. "It is clear," he says, "that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest." "'Affected
with a public interest' is the equivalent of 'subject to the exercise of the police power'; and it is plain that nothing more was
intended by the expression."' 9 He denies that "there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for
what he makes or sells" or that, "however able to regulate other
elements of manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon
' 20
price, the state is incapable of directly controlling price itself.
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either
to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislative
arm, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court
functus officio." ' 21 Instead of freedom's being the rule and restraint the exception, "subject only to constitutional restraint
the private right must yield to the public need."' 22 "And the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
2
relation to the object sought to be attained." 3
In performing their limited judicial function, moreover, the
16 Note 9, above.

1 (1931) 282 U. S. 251. The decision in this case, upholding the legislative power to fix maximum commissions for fire insurance agents, was

placed upon the ground that the fire insurance business had been held in
the German Alliance case to be affected with a public interest.
is Note 5, above.
19 291 U. S. at 536, 533.
P. 532.
21 P. 537.

20

2 p. 525.
23 P. 525.
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courts, according to Mr. Justice Roberts, are to employ a realistic
method; for "The function of the courts in the application of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case
whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a
reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as
arbitrary or discriminatory." In the Nebbia case itself the Court
relies heavily upon the facts brought out in a New York legislative investigation of the milk industry, which preceded the enactment of the law under attack and which revealed that "the normal law of supply and demand was insufficient to correct maladjustments detrimental to the community. The inquiry disclosed
destructive and demoralizing competitive conditions and unfair
trade practices which resulted in retail price cutting and reduced
the income of the farmer below the cost of production.1 24 Inadequate sanitation in the production of milk, as well as economic
evils, were found to flow from the conditions described. 21 Under
the circumstances the Court felt that the legislature had not
acted arbitrarily in resorting to price fixing.
With the decision resting as largely as it does upon the facts
in the industry in question, it obviously would be hazardous to
forecast a frequent acceptance of price fixing or other drastic
forms of legislative control of business on the basis of this single decision. Nor should too much reliance be placed upon the
Court's change of front in regard to the applicable doctrine. Not
only did four dissenting justices stoutly maintain the erstwhile
majority point of view, but Mr. Justice Roberts himself found it
possible to say without hint of irony or of a smile that "The
course of decision in this court exhibits a firm adherence to these
principles." Past decisions invalidating price fixing laws, he
says, "must rest, finally, upon the basis that the requirements
of due process were not met because the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and effect." 20 If these decisions can rest
upon such a basis, so may future decisions similar in tenor.
Nevertheless supporters of government control of business,
whether by the Federal Government or by the states, will find in
the doctrine and in the factual approach of the Court in the
Nebba case their strongest reliance in future efforts to sustain
24 P. 530.

25 P. 511.
P. 537.

26
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drastic regulation. As regards the Federal power, Mr. Justice
Roberts himself takes the occasion to say that "The power to
promote the general welfare is inherent in government. Touching the matters committed to it by the Constitution the United
States possesses the power..."
III. THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL POWER
In another New York milk law decision at the present term of
Court the tide of Federalism appeared to be running strongly at
the same time that realism was prevailing over doctrines which
stood in the way of decisions responsive to social need. An importer of milk from Vermont into New York sought in the Federal District Court to enjoin the enforcement of the Milk Control Act against him. As applied to him, the Act would have
denied licenses to sell in the original cans or in bottles milk
which had been purchased in Vermont at less than the minimum
price to producers, established under the Act. The Supreme
Court affirmed a decree granting an injunction as to sales in the
original cans and held that an injunction should also issue to
protect the dealer's right to sell in bottles at retail without regard to the wholesale price paid in Vermont. The Court rejected
the time-honored argument that when the milk was removed
from the "packages" in which it had been imported it necessarily
became subject to the state law. "The test of the 'original package'," said Mr. Justice Cardozo for the Court, "is not inflexible
The
and final for the transactions in interstate commerce ....
test of the original package is not an ultimate principle. It is an
What is ultimate is the principle
illustration of a principle ....
that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself
in a position of economic isolation. Formulas and2 catchwords
are subordinate to this overmastering requirement."
Conceding that the maintenance of prices to producers in
Vermont might be equally as important to consumers in New
York as the maintenance of such prices in that State, on account
of the effect upon quality, the Court held that this argument
failed to sustain the application of the Act to sellers of imported
milk for two reasons: (1) "There is neither evidence nor presumption that the same minimum prices established by order of
the board for producers in New York are necessary also for
27 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. (1935) 55 S. Ct. 497.
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producers in Vermont"; and (2) "Commerce between the states
is burdened unduly when one state regulates by indirection the
prices to be paid to producers in another, in the faith that augmentation of prices will lift up the level of economic welfare, and
that this will stimulate the observance of sanitary requirements
in the preparation of the product."
Such minimum price regulations applied to products in another state as a condition of their being marketed in the regulating state would be equivalent to the levying of import duties, the
Court pointed out. "If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been
opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted
by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the
nation." "The next step would be to condition importation upon
proof of a satisfactory wage scale in factory or shop, or even
upon proof of the profits of the business. Whatever relation
there may be between earnings and sanitation is too remote and
indirect to justify obstructions to the normal flow of commerce
in its movement between states." "The Constitution was framed
under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in
range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not in division."
Thus the identical factors which justified the application of
the New York Milk Control Act to private businesses despite the
limitations of due process failed to support its application to
production in another state, because of the incapacity of the
states to burden interstate commerce. The conclusion seems to
follow almost without effort that Congress has power to protect producers and consumers in New York from destructive
practices on the part of importers and of producers in other
states, against which the State is powerless to defend them. Mr.
Justice Cardozo, it is true, remits them to the Legislature of
Vermont, which, "If farmers or manufacturers in Vermont are
abandoning farms or factories, or are failing to maintain them
properly, ....
must supply the fitting remedy." But the suggestion is a weak one. Years ago, in his dissent to the first child
labor decision denying to Congress the power to prohibit the
interstate transportation of the products of child labor, Mr.
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Justice Holmes pointed out that the view of the majority created
a governmental vacuum, in which neither the nation nor a state
had power to control destructive competition from outside the
boundaries of the state. 28 Baldwin v. Seelig gives the perfect
answer to Hammer v. Dagenhart and seems to prepare the way
for the deserved repudiation of that unfortunate decision. Mr.
Justice Cardozo, be it noted, spoke for a unanimous court.
The logical consequence of Baldwin v. Seelig is neither much
advanced by the earlier case of Local 167, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, v. United States29 nor greatly weakened by
the recent Railway Pension decision. 0 The Teamsters' case, it is
true, reaffirms all of the prior decisions construing the commerce
clause broadly, but it does not extend to the proposition that
labor conditions in production for interstate commerce or conditions in the marketing of products after they have left what is
usually regarded as interstate commerce are subject to the power
of Congress. The proposition that "The control of the handling,
the sales and the prices at the place of origin before the interstate journey begins or in the state of destination where the
interstate movement ends" and "the sales by marketmen to retailers, the prices charged, and the amount of profits exacted"
are subject to the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
must be taken with the qualification that this subjection to the
Federal power is dependent upon a finding that these activities
"operate directly to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce" or operate "substantially and directly to restrain and
burden . . . . untrammelled shipment and movement . . . .in
interstate commerce." That the level of purchasing power among
workers in all occupations affects interstate commerce vitally;
that a market which is demoralized by shipments from exploiters
of labor in other states is the victim of bad tactics in commerce;
and that local unfair competitive practices will in the long run
impair the market for sales in interstate commerce, may be
fairly apparent, but the Supreme Court is not yet expressly committed to such a view. In the Teamsters' case itself the conspiracy which was enjoined had as one of its objects the parcelling out of the wholesale business in live poultry in New York
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251, at 281.
(1934) 291 U. S. 293.
so Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co. (1935) 55 S.Ct. 758.
28
20
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City among the members of an association of wholesalers, called
marketmen. One of the principal sanctions to be employed was
refusal on the part of members of the Teamsters' union to haul
poultry from the freight terminals to the establishments of marketmen who failed to observe the association's allocation of business. Such refusal would operate and was intended to operate
to prevent the marketmen from purchasing poultry from the "receivers" at the terminals and at West Washington Street Market,
whose function it was to remove the poultry from the cars, crate
it, and sell it to the marketmen. In the companion case of
GreaterNew York Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce v. United
States,31 in which participants in the same conspiracy were criminally convicted, it was held that the sales by receivers to marketmen were in interstate commerce in the same sense as transactions on the grain exchanges and at the stockyards, 2 which are
said really to form a part of the single process of getting commodities from producers to the markets, generally located in
other states. Intention to prevent sales or shipments in interstate commerce, whether through boycott of products or through
stoppages of production, whatever the ultimate purpose, frequently has subjected the tactics of labor to the sanctions of the
anti-trust acts.38 The Teamsters' case adds nothing to those that
went before.
In the Railway Pension case the majority of the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, in addition to
branding many features of the Act of Congress which established compulsory retirement pensions for railway employees as
violations of the due process clause, held that the power to prescribe such pensions for railway employees was not included in
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Whatever may be the merit or lack of merit in the Court's decision,
and whatever the significance of the Court's attitude, the point
actually decided in regard to the scope of the commerce power
31 (C. C. A. 2, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 156, cert. den. (1931) 283 U. S. 837.
32 Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen (1923) 262 U. S. 1; Stafford v. Wallace (1922) 258 U. S. 495; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States (1930)
280 U. S. 420.
83Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274; Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America (1925) 268 U. S. 551; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Jourmen Stone
Cutters' Assn. (1927) 274 U. S. 37.
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has little relation to the question of the constitutionality of
Federal regulation of business in general. Having satisfied itself that pensions to retired employees and the provision of incentives to retirement on the part of employees have little or no
bearing upon efficiency and safety in the operation of railroads,
the Court concluded that the sole purpose of the pension Act was
to minister to the welfare of persons employed by the railroads.
The welfare of people in their old age, which is brought on by
natural causes unrelated to their employment, said the Court, is
a matter for the states and not for Congress to deal with.3 It
follows, as the Court admitted, that features of the employment
relation on the railroads which do bear upon safety or efficiency,
together with factors in the lives of employees growing out of
their employment, are subject to the power of Congress.35 Four
justices, constituting the dissenting minority, pointed out that
"The common judgment takes note of the fact that the retirement of workers by reason of incapacity due to advancing years
is an incident of employment"; that "The fundamental consideration which supports this type of legislation is that industry
should take care of its human wastage, whether that is due to
accident or age"; and that "That view cannot be dismissed as
arbitrary or capricious." And if provision for old age can properly be made an incident of employment, Congress should have
power to regulate that incident of such employment as undoubtedly is subject to its control.
3

, The decision of the Court does not in reality exclude the power of
Congress. No reason appears why Congress could not levy a payroll tax
upon the carriers and provide also for the payment of pensions to retired
employees out of the Treasury. The Court thus far has declined to inquire
into the purpose of Federal tax measures or expenditures except where a
tax law bears evidence on its face that its purpose is to regulate a matter
(child labor) which is beyond the power of Congress to control. Veazie
Bank v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 533; McCray v. United States (1904) 195
U. S. 27; Nigro v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 332; Massachusetts v.
Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) 259
U. S. 20. To guard against an adverse decision upon a pension law enacted
under the taxing power it might be wise to separate the taxing measure
and the law authorizing the payment of pensions.

35 The Court acknowledged the validity of the Safety Appliance and Employers' Liability Acts and cited the case of Tex. & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks (1930) 281 U. S. 548, upholding Congressional
legislation in relation to collective bargaining upon the railroads. Wilson
v. New (1917) 243 U. S. 332, upholding the Adamson 8-hour law, however, involved legislation whose validity "depended upon circumstances so

unusual that this court's decision respecting it cannot be considered a precedent here."
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Thus, even if the Court's decision in the Railway Pension case
be accepted, it remains emphatically true that all transactions
and relations forming part of interstate commerce itself, together
with all conduct substantially affecting interstate commerce, are
within the power of Congress, subject to the limitations of due
process of law. The National Industrial Recovery Act as administered has been applied to four principal groups of businesses,
classified with regard to their relation to interstate commerce.
These are: (1) businesses, such as the trucking business, actually
engaged in the transportation of commodities or in other types
of communication among the states; (2) businesses which ship
in interstate commerce; (3) businesses which furnish a market
for products which move in interstate commerce, either through
purchases from sellers in other states or by reason of providing
an essential outlet, such as retail stores, for products which have
been brought into a state; and (4) businesses, such as local
service trades, whose sole substantial relation to interstate commerce lies in in the purchasing power which those engaged in
them contribute to the ultimate consumers' market for the products of all commerce, both interstate and intrastate. Various
aspects of the conduct of these businesses will, of course, bear
upon interstate commerce with differing degrees of substantiality. Thus the wages paid in a barber shop will affect the purchasing power of the employees, whereas the competitive practices of its proprietor toward a shop across the street can scarcely
be said to affect interstate commerce in a similarly perceptible
manner.
The power of Congress to enact the provisions of the N. I.
R. A. thus becomes a complex question whose solution depends
upon the application of the Act to particular situations. The
answers of the judges to the problems as they arise will depend
upon their ability in the light of the data presented to them to
perceive the economic relations which exist and upon the purposes they seek to serve. The purposes they seek to serve are a
product of their political and social philosophies and can hardly
be altered by any of the methods known to the law. If the
justices who constituted the majority of the Court in the Railway Pension decision, for example, with fair knowledge of present economic circumstances, should be determined to maintain
the limits of the Federal power as they were established in
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Hammer v. Dagenhart, it is useless to expect a change of attitude. If, however, a disposition on the part of any of the justices
to follow that decision is occasioned by a belief that economic
production is still a matter which really is of purely local concern,
and if those who hold to that view have ability to look facts in
the face and to recognize their significance, then there is hope
that his disposition may change, if the facts as they actually are
point to a contrary conclusion. It is worth while inquiring, accordingly, whether the Court in recent months has displayed a
realistic approach to constitutional problems.
IV. REALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

The Supreme Court's appetite for facts and its willingness
during the past several years to vary its decisions upon constitutional questions in accordance with them has been noted
previously.3 A striking example was furnished a year ago in the
case of Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan.37 In that case, under a
Nebraska statute fixing compulsory standard weights for loaves
of bread made for sale in the State, a "tolerance" of three ounces
overweight per pound, with the standard as a minimum weight
within twelve hours after baking, was established by administrative regulation. The statute as elaborated was upheld. In
8 a similar statute
the earlier case of Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan"
providing for a tolerance of two ounces overweight per pound,
with a 24-hour period during which the standard weight was
the minimum, was declared unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Butler
wrote the opinion in both cases. In the earlier decision the evidence was deemed to show that loss of weight through evaporation was likely to be more than two ounces per pound during a
24-hour period unless bread was. wrapped, thus making compliance difficult. In the subsequent case the greater tolerance for
a shorter period was held to cure the arbitrariness which characterized the earlier statute.
Even more striking is the Tennessee Grade Crossing case at
the present term of court,3 9 holding that a crossing elimination
36 Fuchs, Legal Technique and National Control of the Petroleum Industry (1931) 16 St. Louis L. Rev., at 205; Fuchs, The Constitutionality of the
Recovery Program (1933) 19 St. Louis L. Rev., at 22.
87 (1934) 290 U. S. 570.
38 (1924) 264 U. S. 504.
39 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters (1935) 55 S. Ct. 486.
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order imposing half of the cost upon the railroad company may
be so arbitrary as to deprive the carrier of property without due
process of law. Previous decisions had uniformly upheld the
power of the states to protect the public safety by compelling the
elimination of grade crossings at the expense wholly or in part
of the affected railroad company. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, from which the instant case was appealed, had relied
upon these precedents and had declined to consider data advanced
by the railroad company to show that the order was unconstitutional under the circumstances. The Supreme Court, through
Mr. Justice Brandeis, held that where the principal hazard to be
eliminated by a separation of grades arises from the highway
and not from the railroad, where the purpose of the separation
is to expedite high-speed highway traffic as well as to promote
safety, and where the economic effect upon the railroad is likely
to be adverse, the decisions based upon earlier and different
conditions are inapplicable. In other words, new conditions created by the establishment of a nation-wide system of through
highways competing with the railroads call for new law. Courts
from now on in these cases are under a duty to examine the
circumstances and to adapt their decisions to them. "A statute
valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another. A
statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the
conditions to which it is applied." It follows, presumably, that
a statute invalid when originally enacted may be valid when reenacted at a later time by reason of changed circumstances.
As a matter of procedure, one attacking the validity of a
statute must allege and demonstrate the facts which establish
its unconstitutionality, especially where these relate to its operation upon a particular party. 40 The allegations of the petition,
however, if they state a rational basis upon which unconstitu41
tionality may be predicated, will suffice to present the issue.
The Court's ability to appraise the significance of facts when
these have been brought before it and to discriminate in a realistic manner between the rational and constitutional on the one
hand and the arbitrary and unconstitutional on the other hand
seems to have varied considerably during the past two years.
40

Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin (1934) 55 S. Ct. 7; Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell (1935) 55 S. Ct. 538.
4"Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin (1934) 55 S. Ct. 187.
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Few, perhaps, will be found to quarrel with the conclusion that
in the category of arbitrary, confiscatory state action, so long as
that category is maintained for purposes of constitutional adjudication, belong the measures which compel the railroads to
provide the roadbeds for their competitors.4 2 In the cases which
have followed in the train of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium decision43 also, the majority of the Court has shown a fine
ability to differentiate situations which do not call for the application of the liberal doctrine of that celebrated case. In the
Minnesota case it was held that the contract clause of the Federal
constitution did not invalidate the State's Moratorium Law of
April, 1933. That law applied to mortgages existing at the effective date of the law and provided that in appropriate cases, in
judicial proceedings, mortgagors might obtain the stay of foreclosures that might otherwise be had, for periods to be determined in each case but not extending in any event beyond May
1, 1935. Priods of redemption from foreclosure sales already
made might be similarly extended. The act provided that in the
proceedings which it authorized an order might be had, upon
notice, "determining the reasonable value of the income on said
property, or, if the property has no income, then the reasonable
rental value of the property ... ., and directing and requiring
such mortgagor or judgment debtor, to pay all or a reasonable
part of such income or rental value, in or toward the payment
of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage or judgment indebtedness
at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed and determined
and ordered by the court." The act recited the emergency created by the depression. The State presented facts in relation to
the emergency. Others were judicially noticed by the lower court.
The Supreme Court held that, although contracts cannot be destroyed by state legislation, "It does not follow that conditions
may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement
may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the
reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the
42 Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo, however, dissented in the
Tennessee Grade Crossing case, above, upon the ground that the facts advanced by the railroad company and the facts within the range of judicial
notice did not suffice to sustain the burden which rested upon the carrier of
"establishing a violation of its constitutional immunities."
43 Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U. S. 398.
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community ....
And .... that power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent public need demanding ... relief is
produced by ... economic causes." 4 4 The Court concluded that
"An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper
occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the State"
and that the act adopted to meet the emergency, in view of its
temporary nature, its appropriateness, and the manifest endeavor
to conserve the legitimate interests of all parties concerned in
mortgage obligations, was constitutional.
In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas45 the Court declared unconstitutional an Arkansas statute which entirely exempted the proceeds of life, sickness, and accident insurance policies from legal
process, in so far as the statute applied to indebtedness of beneficiaries existing at the time of its passage. The legislature,
unlike that of Minnesota, had made no attempt to discriminate
on the basis of need for relief on the part of particular debtors
or classes of debtors and no attempt to limit the resultant sacrifice of contractual rights to what the public need would justify.
In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Cavanaugh.4 a crude and cynical act of
the legislature of Arkansas, virtually empowering special improvement districts to repudiate their bonds, likewise was held
unconstitutional. The statute in question prescribed the procedure for the collection of special assessments upon property
embraced within such districts, replacing the procedure provided
for in an earlier act which was in effect when outstanding bonds
were issued. The later act, in addition to reducing interest and
penalties upon unpaid assessments, prolonged the minimum time
within which property might be sold for their nonpayment from
65 days to 2
years and provided a further 4-year period of
redemption during which the landowner might remain in possession without payments of any kind. In its opinion the Court
recognized, as it had in the Minnesota Mortgage case, the traditional distinction between the constitutionally protected "obligation" of a contract and the remedy upon the contract. Where it
had been said in the Minnesota case that it was a question of
"reasonableness" whether an impairment of the remedy might
4P. 439.
45 (1934) 292 U. S. 426.
46 (1935) 55 S. Ct. 555.
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amount to an impairment of the obligation, 47 Mr. Justice Cardozo

now referred rather impatiently to "much talk" in the books
"about distinctions between changes of the substance of the
contract and changes of the remedy." "The dividing line," he
said, "is at times obscure."
Thus the immunity conferred by the contract clause becomes
a matter of degree dependent upon facts and upon the appropriateness of legislative measures devised to meet them. The justices
who dissented in the Minnesota case could not refrain in the first
Ark nsa case, in which they concurred, from joining specially
in the decision, for the purpose of pointing out that the Court's
basis for deciding such cases "takes us beyond the fixed and
secure boundaries of the fundamefital law into a precarious
fringe of extraconstitutional territory in which no real boundaries exist. We reject as unsound and dangerous doctrine, threatening the stability of the deliberately framed and wise provisions
of the Constitution, the notion that violations of these provisions
may be measured by the length of time they are to continue or
the extent of the infraction." Such devotion to rigid principle, which, of course, never has characterized the work of the
Court with uniformity, 48 has now definitely yielded to a more
49
discriminating methodology.
Judicial discrimination between the "reasonable" and the "arbitrary" on the basis of economic and practical considerations,
4T

290 U. S., at 430.

48 Cases cited, 290 U.
49 The "Gold Clause"

S. at 436-442.
cases involving private obligations expressed to be
payable in gold dollars of the weight and fineness established at the time
they were issued (Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. C. (1935) 55 S. Ct. 407)
present the same clash between the view of five justices, that governmental
power is not so limited by the Constitution as to prevent its being used to
cope with pressing economic circumstances, and the view of the minority
that the protection afforded to private contracts-in this instance by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment-is absolute. The decision, of
course, involved the power of Congress, as an alleged incident to its undoubted power to change the gold content of the standard dollar or to
authorize the President to do so, to provide that currency representing a
materially smaller quantity of gold must be accepted in satisfaction of
obligations of the type mentioned. The majority of the Court, taking cognizance of the economic dislocation which would result from placing the
holders of billions of dollars of "gold clause" bonds in a preferred position
in the economic order, held that Congress had the incidental power which it
exercised. The minority would have permitted the economic structure to
tumble or, perhaps, have viewed with pleasure the virtual cancellation of
the constitutional power of Congress to regulate the currency, if Congress
could have been forced to yield.
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however, unless indulged in the presence of a genuine deference
to the legislature, can be as obstructive of necessary regulatory
measures as constitutional formulae which are loaded with economic theory. Judicial tyranny can exist under either method
of arriving at decisions. The danger that such tyranny will be
fastened upon the country in connection with the Court's handling
of the "New Deal" legislation is emphasized by the character of
the decision in the Railway Pension case.-0 Not only was the
majority of the Court willing to disregard the belief and the
experience of much of the western world, that provision for old
age may properly be made through the employment relation, and
hence to hold that it cannot become subject to the Federal power
in the most clearly interstate of enterprises, but in addition the
justices laid down a barage of invalidating objections to what
would be essential features of any effective pension plan adopted
as a regulatory measure and drew palpably absurd distinctions
between the law which was under attack and previous legislation
that had been upheld. Thus "the provisions of the Act which
disregard the private and separate ownership of the several
respondents, treat them all as a single employer, and pool all
their assets regardless of their individual obligations and the
varying conditions found in their respective enterprises cannot
be justified as consistent with due process." It is questionable
at best whether a pension plan with separate funds for each carrier could remain solvent in each of the funds. In any event,
as Mr. Chief Justice Hughes forcefully pointed out in his dissent,
pooled funds for accident compensation to employees, for bank
deposit insurance, and for supplementing the earnings of financially weak railroads through loans have been sustained by the
Court. It is difficult to see any basis upon which these precedents
can be distinguished except the justices' dislike of compelling
employers to contribute to the care of retired, superannuated
employees. The distinction sought to be drawn by the majority
between workmen's compensation and old age pensions, on the
ground that the former establishes a substituted liability for
that in tort at common law whereas the latter impose a liability
wholly new, simply goes to show that the justices are likely to
confuse the unfamiliar with the unconstitutional. Since tort
"oNote 30, above.
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liability is confined to instances in which the employer or his
representative has been negligent, while under compensation
laws there is liability without regard to fault, the Chief Justice
correctly points out that "Compensation acts do not simply readjust old burdens and benefits. They add new ones, outside
and beyond former burdens and benefits, and thus in truth add
a new incident to the relation of employer and employee."
Throughout his extremely able and forceful dissent the Chief
Justice battles for a national legislature power which shall be
adequate to cope with pressing national problems, whether wisely
or unwisely in particular instances. That such power should be
in danger of being denied by reason of either rigid constitutional
doctrines or the arbitrary notions, however sincerely held, of a
few judges, seems a sufficient indictment of the system of judicial
review of legislation which makes such an outcome possible.
V. RED TAPE FOR ADMINISTRATORS
As noted previously in these pages, 51 there is danger, even if
the substantive powers conferred in regulatory legislation are
upheld as constitutional, that constitutional requirements in regard to administrative procedure will so hamper the work of
enforcement as to imperil the success of a comprehensive program of control such as that of the "New Deal." The Panama
Refining Company case 52 at the present term of Court appears
to carry forward the tendency to impose hampering restrictions
upon the "bureaucracy" which was so strikingly manifested in
Crowell v. Benson.11 No one, of course, objects to the Constitution's being held to guarantee the essentials of fair procedure in
administrative action that affects private interests. The question
is, in each instance, whether a given procedural requirement
serves a useful purpose which is not bought at too great a
sacrifice of administrative efficiency.
In the Panama Refining Company case the issue was over the
validity of an order of the President, promulgated under section
9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which prohibited
the interstate transportation of petroleum produced in violation
of restrictions imposed by the state in which it was produced.
51 19

St. Louis L. Rev. at 23.

52 (1935)

55 S. Ct. 241.

53(1932) 285 U. S. 22.
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Executive orders to this effect were specifically authorized by
the section of the Act in question, which made their violation a
punishable offense. The Act, however, did not attempt to state
the conditions under which the President should thus, in effect,
translate state laws into Federal measures. The purposes for
which he might do so were ascertainable, if at all from the words
of the Act, from the provisions of section 1, defining the purposes of Congress in enacting the law. The Court held, Mr.
Justice Cardozo alone dissenting, that section 9(c) delegated
legislative power to the President in an unconstitutional manner
because conditions were not specified under which the power
should be exercised and because, in consequence, no findings by
the President upon which an order might be predicated were
made necessary. The general aims set forth in section 1, which,
perhaps, the President was expected to keep in mind in deciding
whether or not to issue an order under section 9(c), are, the
Court felt, too general to serve as a guide. Section 1 declares
the policy of Congress to be to remove obstructions to interstate
commerce, to provide for the general welfare by promoting organization among trade and labor groups, to promote production
and prevent restrictions upon it except temporarily, to increase
consumption and purchasing power, and to conserve natural resources. Among these "numerous and diverse objectives," the
Court stated, the President was not even directed to choose.
The Court's statement that "The Congress manifestly is not
permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is... vested" will be universally
applauded. The real question, however, is whether it did so in
enacting section 9 (c). Mr. Justice Cardozo convincingly brings
out that it did not. The President was to promulgate an order
when he became convinced that the ultimate purposes defined in
section 1 of the Act would be served by an immediate restriction
of interstate transportation, in support of restriction of production by the states. "There is no fear that the nation will drift
from its ancient moorings as the result of the narrow delegation
of power permitted by this section."
The requirement that executive findings specifically set forth
must accompany an executive order of general application is one
wholly new to the law of the Constitution. The Court cites no
authority in its support except two cases dealing with adminis-
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trative orders of specific, not general, application.5 4 In case of
such orders, of course, findings are often essential to inform the
affected parties of the ground of the administrative action and
to furnish a basis for judicial review if that is sought. When it
comes to Presidential rule-making, these reasons are entirely
absent. At the most, the requirement that findings accompany
a Presidential order will help to expose a dishonest use of executive power, provided it cannot be covered by "findings" which
are appropriate to it. The entire effect of the Panama Refining
Company case manifestly will be to introduce additional words
into statutes conferring rule-making power upon the executive
and into the rules promulgated under such statutes, as well as
to stir up litigation for the purpose of challenging the language
of future delegations of power in the hope that it may be found
insufficient.
It is impossible to predict what future requirements in regard to administrative procedure the Court will see fit to impose.
Procedure, of course, is peculiarly within the competence of
lawyers, and a Court made up of lawyers should be able to arrive at realistic decisions in that field. There seems to be danger,
however, that addiction to certain forms will lead, in the words
of Mr. Justice Cardozo, to the ignoring of the truth that "The
Constitution of the United States is not a code of civil practice."
54 The line between orders of specific and those of general application, it
is recognized, is not easy to draw. Orders applicable to a fairly limited
class of persons might be called either the one or the other. Practical considerations often will determine the characterization which will be given to
a particular order and the procedural incidents that will surround its issuance. Thus the Interstate Commerce Commission issues orders which it is
convenient to characterize as "quasi-legislative" to distinguish them from
other orders issued by the Commission which apply to particular carriers
and which are known as "quasi-judicial." Nevertheless, since judicial review is accorded with respect to both classes of orders, findings by the
Commission are prerequisites to both. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. (1935) 55 S. Ct. 268.

